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WHAT'S SO COMPELLING?
"The right to receive information and ideas, regardless of their social worth is
fundamental to our free society."1
'[Ciriminal laws in this area are constitutionally limited to hard-core pornog-
raphy. I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I un-
derstand to be embraced within that shorthand description; and perhaps I
could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it, and the
motion picture involved in this case is not that."2
I. INTRODUCTION
The idea that there is "freedom of speech" traditionally has been
somewhat disingenuous, criticized as a freedom that applied only to
those with the ability to afford the required printing equipment.3
With the advent of the Internet, however, many who previously would
not have been able financially to support a means to disseminate their
ideas could do so with minimal expense, fostering "the marketplace of
ideas."4 However, this newfound freedom also provides "a potentially
harmful media for children."5 Various commercial Internet sites con-
tain graphics that many people would classify as pornographic. 6
Many of these sites offer "teasers," free sexually explicit material that
is intended to entice a person to pay for the opportunity to see more.
While this marketing technique is designed to attract paying adults,
the free teasers are also available to children. "A child with minimal
knowledge of a computer, the ability to operate a browser, and the
skill to type a few simple words may be able to access sexual images
and content over the World Wide Web."7 In fact:
[T]welve percent of websites are pornographic in nature, twenty-five percent
of all Internet search engine requests are for pornography, the average child
first views Internet pornography at age eleven, and eighty percent of fifteen-
to-seventeen-year-olds have experienced multiple hard-core online pornogra-
phy exposures. Approximately 11 million minors visit pornographic websites
each week.8
1. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (citation omitted).
2. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
3. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473, 476 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. It is important to note that there is no legal significance to the word pornography,
and that the word itself can carry negative connotations. Material of this nature
is legally defined as obscene, non-obscene, or harmful when applied to minors.
See infra text accompanying notes 24-42. Further, as a law professor of mine
once pointed out to me (and I paraphrase), "If you like it, it's adult erotica. If you
don't like it, it's pornography." I use the term "pornography" here only to help
illustrate the type of speech at issue-non-obscene, First Amendment protected
sex speech-and pass no judgment on the propriety of such speech.
7. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 476.
8. Leading Cases, Freedom of Speech and Expression, 118 HARv. L. REV. 353,
353-54 (2004) (footnotes omitted).
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In an effort to reduce minors' access to sexually explicit material on
the Internet, Congress, in 1998, passed the Child Online Protection
Act ("COPA"). The Act sought to compel providers of commercial in-
ternet pornography to establish a barrier-an "adult verification
screen"-that would require anyone intending to access such a site to
first prove himself an adult.9
Civil liberty groups, including the American Civil Liberties Union
("ACLU"), and Internet content providers believed COPA was uncon-
stitutional and filed for a preliminary injunction on October 22, 1998,
against the government to prevent the enforcement of the Act.1o The
district court held COPA to a strict scrutiny analysis,1 found that it
failed such an analysis, 12 and granted the preliminary injunction. On
appeal, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed under an abuse of
discretion standard and affirmed the district court.13 The case was
then appealed to the United States Supreme Court. After determin-
ing that the government had "failed... to rebut the plaintiffs conten-
tion that there are plausible less restrictive alternatives to the
statute,"'14 chiefly filtering software,15 and taking into consideration
several "practical reasons,"16 the Supreme Court held that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in granting the injunction. Further,
without declaring with finality whether COPA is unconstitutional, the
9. 47 U.S.C. § 231(a)(1) (2000), validity called into doubt by Ashcroft v. Am. Civil
Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656 (2004).
10. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473.
11. There are several levels of scrutiny that courts will apply to a regulation of
speech, depending on what type of regulation is at issue. "The most exacting
scrutiny test [strict scrutiny] is applied to regulations that suppress, disadvan-
tage, or impose different burdens upon speech on the basis of its content .... " 16A
AM. JuR. 2D Constitutional Law § 460 (2005) (emphasis added). However, "regu-
lations that are unrelated to content are subject to an intermediate level of scru-
tiny reflecting the less substantial risk of excising ideas or viewpoints from public
dialogue." Id. (emphasis added). In other words, a "content-based" regulation
will receive strict scrutiny, while a "content-neutral" regulation will receive inter-
mediate scrutiny.
12. COPA was found to be a content-based regulation and, as such, was subject to
strict scrutiny. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 492. As Justice Breyer later explained,
subjecting the statute to strict scrutiny would "require the Government to show
that any restriction of nonobscene expression is 'narrowly drawn' to further a
'compelling interest' and that the restriction amounts to the 'least restrictive
means' available to further that interest." Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 677 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting). See infra text accompanying notes 64-66.
13. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 240 (3d Cir. 2003).
14. Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 660.
15. Id. at 666-67.
16. Id. at 670-71. The Court listed three practical reasons why the preliminary in-
junction should be upheld: (i) "the potential harms from reversing the injunction
outweigh those of leaving it in place by mistake;" (ii) "there are substantial fac-
tual disputes remaining in the case;" and (iii) "the factual record does not reflect
current technological reality." Id.
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Supreme Court stated that "COPA should be enjoined because the
statute likely violates the First Amendment."17 The case was then
remanded to the district court to adjudicate the constitutionality of
COPA on its merits.
The Court was to decide solely on the issue of the injunction and
was not adjudicating the case on its merits.1S However, in its majority
opinion, the Court directly stated that COPA was "likely" unconstitu-
tional, which illustrates how the Court will probably rule when it has
to decide the constitutionality of COPA on its merits. It is this lan-
guage that compels analysis.
This Note will begin, in Part II, with an examination of the circum-
stances leading to the Supreme Court's decision, discussing both the
case history of sex speech as well as the legislative backdrop to the
creation of COPA. Next, section III.A will demonstrate how the ma-
jority opinion of the Supreme Court narrowed the protected class orig-
inally intended by Congress. Section III.B will explain how the
majority opinion's arguments touting filtering software as a more ef-
fective and less restrictive means fail when applied to the intended
broader class. Section III.C will argue that these findings are directly
related to the Supreme Court's implicit reliance on Ginsberg v. New
York;19 that the Supreme Court should abandon Ginsberg, which al-
17. Id. at 660. This was a five to four decision. Justice Scalia filed his own dissenting
opinion, in which he stated that the First Amendment does not protect the speech
in question and that the statute should not be subjected to strict scrutiny. Id.
(Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer wrote a lengthy dissent, with which Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor joined. Id. at 676 (Breyer, J., dissent-
ing). Justice Breyer accepted the majority position that COPA should be sub-
jected to strict scrutiny. However, after examination of the actual burdens placed
on the protected speech, the compelling interest furthered by COPA, and the less
restrictive means suggested by the majority, Justice Breyer refused to accept the
majority conclusion that "Congress could have accomplished its statutory objec-
tive-protecting children from commercial pornography on the Internet-in
other, less restrictive ways." Id. at 677.
18. Id. at 664-65 (majority opinion).
19. 390 U.S. 629 (1968). The district court cited to, among other cases, Ginsberg to
support the contention that: "It is clear that Congress has a compelling interest
in the protection of minors, including shielding them from materials that are not
obscene by adult standards." Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d
473, 495 (E.D. Pa. 1999). Similarly, the Third Circuit cited to Ginsberg to support
the statement that: "The Supreme Court has held that 'there is a compelling in-
terest in protecting the physical and psychological well-being of minors."' Am.
Civil Liberties Union v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 240, 251 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing Gins-
berg, 390 U.S. at 638 ("The well-being of its children is of course a subject within
the State's constitutional power to regulate ... at least if it was rational for the
legislature to find that the minors' exposure to such material might be harm-
ful.")). While the Supreme Court majority opinion never cites to Ginsberg, the
dissent does: "To be sure, our cases have recognized a compelling interest in pro-
tecting minors from exposure to sexually explicit materials." Ashcroft, 542 U.S.
at 675 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Ginsberg, 390 U.S. 629). The majority's reli-
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lows a rational relation test to validate the first prong of a strict scru-
tiny analysis;20 and that the Supreme Court should oblige empirical
evidence relating to the need for such legislation (i.e., relating to the
compelling interest) from Congress. Only then will the
(un)constitutionality of such an act be arguable. While in sections
III.A and III.B I disagree with the Court's finding of a more effective,
less restrictive means, the concluding argument of this Note is that if
empirical evidence of the harm caused to minor children by sex speech
were presented to the Court (via legislative findings), then the Court
would be better suited to discuss the existence of a compelling interest
and the constitutionality of a proposed remedy.
2 1
II. HISTORY AND JURISPRUDENCE-THE SEX
SPEECH BACKDROP
Before any attempt is made to discuss the main arguments
presented in this Note, it is imperative to understand the legislative
and judicial backdrop from which these arguments were formed. I
will therefore present, in section II.A, a general case history and show
how the Supreme Court distinguishes between sex speech that is pro-
tected by the First Amendment (i.e., non-obscene speech), and that
which is not protected by the First Amendment (i.e., that which is ob-
scene). In section II.B I will discuss how the Supreme Court treats
regulations that attempt to prevent minors from coming into contact
with sex speech that, although protected by the First Amendment, is
seen as harmful to their development and well-being. In section II.C I
will discuss the Communications Decency Act ("CDA"), the first at-
tempt by Congress to regulate non-obscene sex speech on the Internet.
Finally, in sections II.D and II.E, I will give a detailed description of
the regulation at issue in this Note, COPA, and the Supreme Court's
opinion that ultimately ruled that Act "likely" unconstitutional.
A. General History-Roth, Paris Adult Theater I, and Miller
Sex speech, and its interaction with the First Amendment, has an
interesting jurisprudence. In modern times, the debate between what
constitutes First Amendment protected sex speech and what is unpro-
tected obscenity evolved in three main cases, all of which will be dis-
cussed in this section.
ance, while not explicit, is implicit due to the structure of their argument. See
infra notes 103-04, 151-52 and accompanying text.
20. See infra sections II.A-B.
21. This Note's main contentions concern the compelling interest and least restrictive
prongs of the strict scrutiny test (i.e., those relied upon by the Supreme Court).
All arguments concerning the narrowness prong (i.e., those raised by the Third
Circuit but ignored by the Supreme Court) are outside the scope of this Note.
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The first case of particular importance is Roth v. United States.22
There, the Court stated that "the unconditional phrasing of the First
Amendment was not intended to protect every utterance."2 3 But, the
Court continued:
[Slex and obscenity are not synonymous. Obscene material is material which
deals with sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest. The portrayal of
sex, e.g., in art, literature and scientific works, is not itself sufficient reason to
deny material the constitutional protection of freedom of speech and press....
It is therefore vital that the standards for judging obscenity safeguard the
protection of freedom of speech and press for material which does not treat sex
in a manner appealing to prurient interest. 24
The Court in Roth then defined that which appeals to a prurient inter-
est as that which is "a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or
excretion."25 Sex speech, which does not appeal to the "prurient inter-
est," is protected under the First Amendment; obscenity, which does
appeal to the "prurient interest," is not.26 This distinction became
known as the Roth standard.
The next major case was Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton,27 which
concerned a consenting adult's right to view what he chooses. Because
the case involved a consenting adult audience, concern was raised
about the constitutionality of the Roth standard. The opinion, written
by Chief Justice Burger, stated:
In particular, we hold that there are legitimate state interests at stake in
stemming the tide of commercialized obscenity, even assuming it is feasible to
enforce effective safeguards against exposure to juveniles and to passersby.
Rights and interests "other than those of the advocates are involved." These
include the interest of the public in the quality of life and the total community
environment, the tone of commerce in the great city centers, and, possibly, the
public safety itself.
28
The Court in Paris Adult Theater I reaffirmed the Roth obscenity
standard, and emphasized that the standard did not violate the First
22. 354 U.S. 476 (1957); see also FindLaw, U.S. Constitution: First Amendment,
http://supreme.lp.findlaw.com/constitution/amendmentO/19.html (last visited
May 15, 2006) [hereinafter U.S. Constitution].
23. Roth, 354 U.S. at 483.
24. Id. at 487-88 (footnotes omitted).
25. Id. at 487 n.20.
26. Protection under this standard depends on "whether to the average person, ap-
plying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material
taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest." Id. at 489.
27. 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
28. Id. at 57 (citation omitted); see also U.S. Constitution, supra note 22 ("Chief Jus-
tice Burger for the Court observed that the States have wider interests than pro-
tecting juveniles and unwilling adults from exposure to pornography; legitimate
state interests, effectuated through the exercise of the police power, exist in pro-
tecting and improving the quality of life and the total community environment, in
improving the tone of commerce in the cities, and in protecting public safety.").
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or Fourteenth Amendments, even in the context of consenting
adults.29
While the Roth standard confirmed that some utterances were
outside of the First Amendment circle, that standard remained some-
what vague and, as such, was seen by the Court as too broad.30 The
Supreme Court, in Miller v. California,31 sought to clear up some of
the ambiguity and attempted to give a clearer and narrower standard
of what was not protected under the First Amendment by adding sev-
eral requirements to the Roth standard:
The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether "the average
person, applying contemporary community standards" would find that the
work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work
depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically
defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a
whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
3 2
The Miller majority developed what has become known as the Miller
standard, the test used to determine what is obscene today.
B. As to Minors-Ginsberg v. New York
Five years before the Supreme Court decided Miller, it was asked
to review the ability of a state legislature to regulate non-obscene
(First Amendment protected) sex speech that was available to minors.
In that case, Ginsberg v. New York, 33 the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of a New York statute that prohibited "the sale to
minors under 17 years of age of material defined to be obscene on the
basis of its appeal to them whether or not it would be obscene to
adults."34
The Ginsberg Court, before upholding the constitutionality of the
statute, stated "the State has an interest 'to protect the welfare of chil-
dren' and to see that they are 'safeguarded from abuses' which might
prevent their 'growth into free and independent well-developed men
29. Paris Adult Theater 1, 413 U.S. at 57.
30. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 22-25 (1973).
31. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
32. Id. at 24 (citation omitted). The Court alluded to the idea that while the analysis
of what appeals to the prurient interest and is patently offensive "are essentially
questions of fact" that can be judged under the local community standards, id. at
30; see also, e.g., Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 104 (1974) ("A juror is
entitled to draw on his knowledge of the views of the average person in the com-
munity or vicinage from which he comes for making the required determination
.... "), the third prong of the test should be determined under a reasonable person
standard, see, e.g., Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 500-01 (1987) (stating that the
test concerns "whether a reasonable person would find [literary, artistic, political,
or scientific] value in the material, taken as a whole") (emphasis added); see also
U.S. Constitution, supra note 22.
33. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
34. Id. at 631.
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and citizens."' 35 Therefore, the "only question"36 the Supreme Court
saw as needing an answer was whether the state legislature could "ra-
tionally conclude"37 that contact with the material regulated by the
statute could cause such a developmental hindrance.
The Court conceded that "the growing consensus of commentators
is that . . . 'these studies all agree that a causal link has not been
demonstrated,'" but then went on to say that these studies all "equally
agree[ ] that a causal link has not been disproved either."38 The Court
subsequently cited a then recently conducted study and quoted an
"unofficial poll" of psychiatrists:
Psychiatrists made a distinction between the reading of pornography, as un-
likely to be per se harmful, and the permitting of the reading of pornography,
which was conceived as potentially destructive. The child is protected in his
reading of pornography by the knowledge that it is pornographic, i.e., disap-
proved. It is outside of parental standards and not a part of his identification
processes. To openly permit implies parental approval and even suggests se-
ductive encouragement.
3 9
The Court concluded its analysis by saying the statute could not be
found to have "no rational relation to the objective of safeguarding
such minors from harm."40 The Court did not require the legislature
to prove or provide any evidence that harm was actually caused by the
sex speech, but rather yielded to the state legislature's ability to "ra-
tionally" conclude that such harm could be caused.41
C. Communications Decency Act
In 1996, with the increased use of the Internet, Congress, to allevi-
ate what it saw as a forum that would potentially harm the develop-
35. Id. at 640-41.
36. Id. at 641.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 642.
39. Id. at 642-43 n.10 (quoting Willard M. Gaylin, The Prickly Problems of Pornogra-
phy, 77 YALE L.J. 579, 594 (1968)).
40. Id. at 643 (emphasis added). The Court in Ginsberg noted that the New York
Legislature condemned the speech by saying such speech is "a basic factor in im-
pairing the ethical and moral development of our youth and a clear and present
danger to the people of the state." Id. at 641. However, the Court then said "[it
is very doubtful that this finding expresses an accepted scientific fact." Id. (em-
phasis added).
41. See Andrew Koppelman, Does Obscenity Cause Moral Harm?, 105 COLUM. L. REV.
1635, 1654 (2005) ("The Court observed that most parents did not want their
children to see these publications, and the legislature could appropriately wish to
help those parents.... But the Court also cited the state's 'independent interest
in the well-being of its youth.' It did not specify just what harm the state was
preventing, and the most articulate source it quoted emphasized a distinction
between the reading of pornography, as unlikely to be per se harmful, and the
permitting of the reading of pornography, which was conceived as potentially
destructive.").
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ment and well being of children, passed the CDA.42 The CDA, in part,
stated:
Whoever... (A) uses an interactive computer service to send to a specific
person or persons under 18 years of age, or (B) uses any interactive computer
service to display in a manner available to a person under 18 years of age, any
comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication that,
is obscene or child pornography, regardless of whether the user of such service
placed the call or initiated the communication... shall be fined under Title 18
or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.
4 3
The CDA, however, provided a defense to prosecution, which could be
asserted by anyone who "has restricted access to such communication
by requiring use of a verified credit card, debit account, adult access
code, or adult personal identification number."4 4
The ACLU challenged the CDA's constitutionality, and in Reno v.
American Civil Liberties Union45 the Supreme Court struck down the
CDA because it violated the First Amendment. There were four rea-
sons why the Court found the CDA unconstitutional. First, "[ulnder
the CDA ... neither the parents' consent-nor even their participa-
tion-in the communication would avoid the application of the stat-
ute."4 6 Second, the CDA made no distinctions between commercial
and non-commercial providers.47 Third, the Court found that the
"CDA fails to provide us with any definition of the term 'indecent'...
and, importantly, omits any requirement that the 'patently offensive'
material . . . lack serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value."48 Finally, the Court pointed to the definition of minor, holding
that the CDA applied to children under eighteen years old, which "in-
cludes an additional year of those nearest majority."49 Because of
these problems, the CDA was found to place "an unacceptably heavy
burden on protected speech,"50 and therefore was not narrowly tai-
lored to serve the compelling governmental interest. Congress went
back to the drawing boards and, after it corrected the constitutional
problems found in the CDA, passed COPA.
D. Child Online Protection Act
COPA seemingly fixed what the Court saw as constitutional
problems with the CDA. Congress composed COPA to allow for paren-
42. 47 U.S.C. § 223 (2000), declared unconstitutional by Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties
Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
43. Id. § 223(d).
44. Id. § 223(e)(5)(B).
45. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
46. Id. at 865.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 866.
50. Id. at 882.
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tal discretion, 5 1 to apply only to commercial providers, 52 to include a
requirement that the patently offensive material lack "serious liter-
ary, artistic, political, or scientific value,"53 and redefined minor to in-
dividuals under seventeen years of age.
5 4
COPA seeks to establish a barrier, an adult-verification screen,
whereby an Internet user who wishes to access free sexually explicit
material must first identify himself as an adult. COPA applies to "any
communication for commercial purposes that is available to any minor
and that includes any material that is harmful to minors."5 5 Violation
of COPA is punishable by a fine "not more than $50,000 [and impris-
onment] not more than six months, or both."56 Further, for inten-
tional violations of COPA, an additional criminal fine can be assessed
up to $50,000 for each violation as well as a civil fine of up to $50,000
for each violation.5 7
COPA, however, creates an affirmative defense whereby the con-
tent provider can avoid prosecution "by requiring use of a credit card,
debit account, adult access code,... adult personal identification num-
ber; ... digital certificate that verifies age; or... any other reasonable
measures that are feasible under available technology."5 8 Along with
this affirmative defense, COPA provides that "[n] o cause of action may
be brought in any court ... against any person... [who] has taken in
good faith to implement a defense authorized under" COPA.59 Fi-
nally, COPA takes into account privacy concerns with a provision that
states the person operating such an Internet site "shall not disclose
51. See 47 U.S.C. § 231(a)(1) (2000), validity called into doubt by Ashcroft v. Am.
Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656 (2004).
52. See id.
53. Id. § 231(e)(6)(C).
54. See id. § 231(e)(7).
55. Id. § 231(a)(1). COPA defines minor as "any person under 17 years of age." Id.
§ 231(e)(7). COPA defines harmful material as
any communication, picture, image, graphic image file, article, record-
ing, writing, or other matter of any kind that is obscene or that-(A) the
average person, applying contemporary community standards, would
find, taking the material as a whole and with respect to minors, is de-
signed to appeal to, or is designed to pander to, the prurient interest; (B)
depicts, describes, or represents, in a manner patently offensive with re-
spect to minors, an actual or simulated sexual act...; and (C) taken as a
whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for
minors.
Id. § 231(e)(6)(A)-(C). COPA defines commercial purposes as "engaged in ...
business," which COPA defines as operating "with the objective of earning a
profit as a result of such activities." Id. § 231(e)(2)(A)-(B).
56. Id. § 231(a)(1).
57. Id. § 231(a)(2)-(3). An offense is defined as each day the site stands contrary to
COPA. Id.
58. Id. § 231(c)(1)(A)-(C).
59. Id. § 231(c)(2).
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any information collected for the purposes of restricting access to such
communications to individuals seventeen years of age or older."6o
E. Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union
On October 22, 1998, the ACLU, others concerned with civil liber-
ties, and Internet content providers filed a lawsuit in the United
States District Court of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania which
challenged COPA on First and Fifth Amendment grounds, and sought
an injunction to prevent enforcement of COPA.61
Before any analysis of specific facts, the district court established
the level of scrutiny to be used. The district court found the COPA
regulation was a "content-based regulation,"6 2 and as such "COPA is
presumptively invalid and is subject to strict scrutiny."6 3 That is to
say, "the content of such protected speech may be regulated in order to
promote a compelling governmental interest 'if [the government]
chooses the least restrictive means to further the articulated inter-
est."' 64 This is a three-step analysis. First, a court has to verify the
compelling governmental interest. Second, a court has to make cer-
tain the provisions of the regulation are narrowly tailored to achieve
that compelling interest. Finally, a court must make certain that the
regulation is the least restrictive means to accomplish that end.65
The district court confirmed "ilt is clear that Congress has a com-
pelling interest in the protection of minors."66 Further, the court
ruled that there was no broader congressional intent other than "to
require the commercial pornographer to put sexually explicit
messages 'behind the counter' on the Web, similar to existing require-
ments in some states that such material to be held behind the counter
or sold in a paper wrapper in a physical store."67 However, the court
questioned the scope of COPA, saying that the Act could have been
made less restrictive "if the prohibited forms of content had included,
for instance, only pictures, images, or graphic image files, which are
typically employed by adult entertainment Web sites as 'teasers' ...
[or] ... without the imposition of possibly excessive and serious crimi-
nal penalties."6s Moreover, after examining several factors that "re-
duce the benefit that will be realized by the implementation of
60. Id. § 231(d)(1)(A).
61. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
62. Id. at 492. For a description of content-based versus content-neutral regulations,
see supra notes 11-12.
63. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 493.
64. Id. (quoting Sable Commc'ns of Cal., Inc. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 492 U.S.
115, 126 (1989)).
65. See id. at 493-96.
66. Id. at 495.
67. Id. at 495-96.
68. Id. at 497.
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COPA,"69 the court concluded that the availability of other technology
such as filtering software presented a likely more effective and less
restrictive means to accomplish the governmental goal. 70 The court
concluded there was a likelihood of success on the merits and granted
the motion for the preliminary injunction. 7
1
On appeal, the Third Circuit upheld the district court's finding.72
However, this court did not base its determination on the district
court's analysis. Instead, it based its finding "on COPA's reliance on
'contemporary community standards' in the context of the electronic
medium of the Web to identify material that is harmful to minors."7 3
Finding that prior community standards jurisprudence '%as no appli-
cability to the Internet and the Web [because] Web publishers are cur-
rently without the ability to control the geographic scope of the
recipients of their communications," 74 the court concluded that due to
the community standards language "COPA ... is more likely than not
to be found unconstitutional as overbroad on the merits. 75
The Supreme Court reversed the Third Circuit on the point of the
community standards language, holding "that COPA's reliance on
community standards to identify 'material that is harmful to minors'
does not by itself render the statute substantially overbroad for pur-
poses of the First Amendment."76 The Supreme Court emphasized
the narrowness of its decision, and made no determination as to
whether: (i) COPA would not pass a strict scrutiny analysis; (ii)
COPA was too vague; or (iii) COPA was overly broad for other reasons.
Although the respondents asked the Supreme Court to immediately
resolve those issues, the Supreme Court remanded the case back to
the Third Circuit to investigate those three issues first.7 7
Upon remand, the Third Circuit again affirmed the district court's
decision and upheld the injunction. This time, following the district
court's framework, the Third Circuit turned to the question of whether
69. Id. The factors considered by the court were the ability to access foreign web
sites, obscene non-commercial sites, and minors who legitimately have a credit
card and who might therefore be able to circumvent the COPA barrier. Id.
70. The court briefly analyzed the technology before making this conclusion, but
stated that "the final determination must await trial on the merits." Id.
71. Id. at 498. The court also had to determine that the plaintiffs would suffer irrep-
arable harm, and then balance that harm against the interest of the government.
The court found that there would be irreparable harm to the plaintiffs, and that
their harm "outweigh[ed] any purported interest of the [government]." Id.
72. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162, 173 (3d Cir. 2000), vacated, 535
U.S. 564 (2002).
73. Id. Consequently, the Third Circuit did not here address the district court's anal-
ysis concerning the strict scrutiny test. Id. at 173-74.
74. Id. at 180.
75. Id. at 181.
76. Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564, 585 (2002).
77. Id. at 585-86.
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COPA could withstand strict scrutiny. It agreed with the district
court that the Act passed the first prong, finding a compelling govern-
mental interest. 78 However, the Third Circuit determined that COPA
failed both the second (narrowly tailored) 79 and third (least restric-
tive)8 0 prongs of the strict scrutiny test.
The government again appealed to the Supreme Court. To rebut
the respondent's claim that the use of filtering software is as effective
as COPA, the government argued that filters have to be purchased.8 1
The Court touched "the argument that filtering software is not an
available alternative because Congress may not require it to be
used."8 2 The Court, however, quickly dismissed this notion, stating
that the "argument carries little weight, because Congress undoubt-
78. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 240, 251 (3d Cir. 2003) ("'[Tlhere
is a compelling interest in protecting the physical and psychological well-being of
minors.' The parties agree that the Government's stated interest in protecting
minors from harmful material online is compelling." (citations omitted)).
79. The Third Circuit listed several provisions of COPA it deemed were not narrowly
tailored to achieve the compelling interest. Those were:
[Tihe definition of "material that is harmful to minors," which includes
the concept of taking "as a whole" material designed to appeal to the
"prurient interest" of minors; and material which (when judged as a
whole) lacks "serious literary" or other "value" for minors; ... the defini-
tion of "commercial purposes," which limits the reach of the statute to
persons "engaged in the business" (broadly defined) of making communi-
cations of material that is harmful to minors; and ... the "affirmative
defenses" available to publishers, which require the technological screen-
ing of users for the purpose of age verification.
Id. There is a lengthy discussion articulating why the Third Circuit felt that
these provisions were not narrowly tailored. See id. at 251-61. However, in the
subsequent Supreme Court decision, the Supreme Court affirmed only the dis-
trict court's decision for reasons relied upon by the district court, namely the
availability of a more efficient and less restrictive means, and did not consider
the validity of these constitutionally tougher arguments. The Supreme Court
also avoided commenting on tough constitutional issues brought up by the Third
Circuit concerning the over breadth of the statutory language. Ashcroft v. Am.
Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656, 665 (2004).
80. Subjecting COPA to the third part of the strict scrutiny test, the Third Circuit
examined whether COPA was the least restrictive means available to accomplish
the perceived compelling interest. Similar to the district court, the Third Circuit
relied to a great extent on the existence of filtering software. The government
had the burden of showing that filtering software was not as effective as COPA,
and made three arguments to that end:
(1) [Fliltering software is voluntary-it transfers the burden of protect-
ing children from the source of the harmful material... to the potential
victims and their parents; (2) filtering software is often both over- and
underinclusive of targeted material; and (3) it is more effective to screen
material "prior to it being sent or posted to minors" on the Internet.
Ashcroft, 322 F.3d at 262. The Third Circuit rejected these three arguments and,
relying on the existence of filtering software, again affirmed the district court's
decision to issue the injunction. Id. at 265.
81. Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 669.
82. Id.
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edly may act to encourage the use of filters."83 To reinforce this state-
ment, the Supreme Court relied heavily on United States v. Playboy
Entertainment Group.8 4 Citing that case, the Court determined that
"[a] court should not assume a plausible, less restrictive alternative
would be ineffective; and a court should not presume parents, given
full information, will fail to act."8 5
The Supreme Court, while it seemingly assumed a compelling in-
terest existed, did not address the arguments raised by the Third Cir-
cuit concerning the second part of the strict scrutiny analysis.
Instead, similar to the district court, it moved directly to the third
prong, and focused on the existence of filtering software to determine
if there was a less restrictive means to COPA that was at least as
effective to accomplish the compelling interest.
The Court examined several factors before determining that COPA
was found to be more restrictive than filtering software. First, the
Court looked at the nature of filtering software, and concluded that
filtering software was necessarily less restrictive as it "impose[s] se-
lective restrictions on speech at the receiving end, not universal re-
strictions at the source."8 6 Those who wish to do so can screen the
specific material they do not want instead of forcing everything to be
screened. For example, adults can turn off the screen if they do not
want it, or even not install one if they do not have children. Second,
the Court addressed privacy concerns, pointing out that filters would
afford access to explicit material without having a person identify
himself or provide a credit card number.8 7 Finally, and most convinc-
ingly for the Court, COPA was found to be more restrictive in that it
provides for criminal penalties for dissemination of speech that is pro-
tected by the First Amendment.8 8 The Court found that "[a]bove all,
promoting the use of filters does not condemn as criminal any category
of speech."89
The Court then examined the effectiveness of filtering software
compared to COPA, pointing to a study conducted by a congressional
commission specifically created to compare filtering software and age-
verification screens. That commission found that filters have an effec-
tiveness rating of 7.4, versus adult verification screens which have an
effectiveness rating of 5.9. 9 0 In part, this discrepancy is due to the
fact that forty percent of the explicit material on the Internet comes
83. Id.
84. 529 U.S. 803 (2000). See infra notes 127-40 and accompanying text.
85. Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 669 (quoting Playboy, 529 U.S. at 824).
86. Id. at 667.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 668. A higher rating means that method is more effective than a method
with a lower number.
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from overseas91 sites. Filters would be more effective for these sites
because overseas sites would not be required to provide adult-verifica-
tion screens. The Court also noted "that filters can be applied to all
forms of Internet communication, including e-mail" and non-commer-
cial Internet sites, not just the commercial Internet sites to which
COPA only applies. 9 2 The Court finally noted that verification sys-
tems are open to circumvention by some minors who have their own
credit or debit card.
9 3
Finding that filtering software presents a less restrictive, more ef-
fective means to accomplish the compelling governmental interest, the
majority concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion,
found that COPA was "likely" unconstitutional, and upheld the
injunction.
III. ANALYSIS
COPA was written to apply to commercial website operators who
make certain sexually explicit material "available to any minor."9 4
Congress, when enacting COPA, accompanied the Act with several
congressional findings. The first such finding stated that "the wide-
spread availability of the Internet presents opportunities for minors to
access materials through the World Wide Web in a manner that can
frustrate parental supervision or control."9 5 However, in the second
congressional finding, Congress asserted that "the protection of the
physical and psychological well-being of minors by shielding them
from materials that are harmful to them is a compelling governmental
interest."96 The Supreme Court, in its majority opinion, seemingly
implied that COPA did advance a bona fide compelling interest, but
never stated exactly what that compelling interest was. Instead, the
Court apparently interpreted the first of the findings as the congres-
sional "goal"9 7 of COPA, and construed Congress's language to mean
that "COPA presumes that parents lack the ability, not the will, to
monitor what their children see."98 This interpretation gave way to
the main thrust of the majority's finding that the availability of filter-
ing software imparts a less restrictive means necessary to accomplish
the objective of the statute. Therefore, when subjecting the statute to
strict scrutiny, the Court concluded that COPA would "likely" be un-
91. Id. at 667.
92. Id. at 668.
93. Id.
94. 47 U.S.C. § 231(a)(1) (2000), validity called into doubt by Ashcroft v. Am. Civil
Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656 (2004).
95. Child Online Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, Div. C, Title XIV, § 1402(1)
(1998), 112 Stat. 2681-736 (1998).
96. Id. § 1402(2).
97. Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 669.
98. Id. at 670.
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constitutional and upheld the injunction. However, the Court was
wrong in using such a narrow construction of those to be protected;
COPA was not meant to protect only those minors whose parents have
the knowledge, wherewithal, and presence to install filtering software
but rather was meant to protect any minor. Instead of focusing on the
introductory finding, the Court should have focused on the language of
the actual statute and the genuine definition of the compelling inter-
est Congress gives in the second congressional findings note.
Filtering software does not accomplish the compelling interest as
effectively as COPA when a broader reading of those intended to be
protected by the statute is used. Therefore, since the Supreme Court
narrowed the actual governmental compelling interest by narrowing
the protected class, the arguments presented in the majority opinion
concerning an available more effective, less restrictive means fail.
The Supreme Court's majority finding is directly related to its
struggle to define what the actual compelling interest advanced by
COPA is. This struggle stems from the continued refusal to require
empirical evidence and proof of the harm caused by sex speech on mi-
nor children (the scheme that was first advanced in Ginsberg). Only
when the Supreme Court abandons the sentiment advanced by Gins-
berg and requires that empirical evidence be provided will the Court
be able to determine the existence of a compelling interest and the
constitutionality of any regulation designed to prevent that harm.
A. That's Not What We Meant
The district court stated there is a compelling governmental inter-
est advanced by COPA: "It is clear that Congress has a compelling
interest in the protection of minors, including shielding them from
materials that are not obscene by adult standards."99 Taking these
words at face value, it appears that the compelling interest is very
broad; the term "minor" is not modified or restricted in any manner,
and the protection of every minor is the compelling interest.
The Third Circuit defined the compelling interest similarly to the
district court. It stated that "protecting the physical and psychological
well-being of minors"'0 0 and "protecting minors from harmful mate-
rial online"101 are compelling interests. Again, through this manner
of defining the compelling interest the court did not modify "minor" in
any way; protecting all minors is the governmental compelling inter-
est. Indeed, the Third Circuit even refused to interpret COPA as
meaning anything but every person under seventeen, arguing that
99. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473, 495 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
100. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 240, 251 (3d Cir. 2003).
101. Id.
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[because the plain meaning of the statute's text is evident, we de-
cline to rewrite Congress's definition of 'minor."'
10 2
However, nowhere in the majority opinion of the Supreme Court
does the Court directly state "_ is the compelling interest advanced
by COPA." This detail notwithstanding, the fact that the dissenting
opinion stated that no one denies that the governmental interest of
protecting minors from exposure to commercial pornography "is com-
pelling,"'o3 combined with the structure of the majority's argument
(moving to the third prong of the strict scrutiny analysis), clearly sup-
ports the inference that the majority assumed the existence of a com-
pelling governmental interest.' 0 4 But what is the compelling
interest?
Congress drafted COPA to specifically state that the prohibited
conduct applies to commercial material made "available to any mi-
nor"105 and defined minor as "any person under seventeen years of
age."1o6 The statute contains no language that should qualify the
word "any."' 0 7 Additionally, Congress, when enacting COPA, accom-
panied the Act with several congressional findings. While the first
such finding stated that "the widespread availability of the Internet
presents opportunities for minors to access materials through the
World Wide Web in a manner that can frustrate parental supervision
or control," 0 8 the second finding asserted that "the protection of the
physical and psychological well-being of minors by shielding them
from materials that are harmful to them is a compelling governmental
interest."109 When defining the compelling interest, Congress articu-
102. Id. at 254. The Third Circuit, using this broad definition, suggested the term
minor is too broad. The court argued, for example, that material could be educa-
tional for a sixteen year old but offensive to a ten year old. Therefore, the court
concluded that the term minor, since it included everyone under the age of seven-
teen, was too vague. Id. at 268. It would, the court argued, require a Web pub-
lisher to post material according to the youngest child that might be viewing the
site. "COPA's definition of 'minor' includes all children under the age of seven-
teen .... We cannot say whether such a minor would be five years of age, three
years, or even two months .... The chilling effect caused by this vagueness of-
fends the Constitution." Id. at 269 n.37.
103. Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 683 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
104. See id. at 666 (majority opinion) ("The purpose of the test is to ensure that speech
is restricted no further than necessary to achieve the goal.") (emphasis added).
105. 47 U.S.C. § 231(a)(1) (2000), validity called into doubt by Ashcroft v. Am. Civil
Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656 (2004) (emphasis added).
106. Id. § 231(e)(7).
107. It is important to note that COPA does not restrict a parent from accessing this
commercial material and then transmitting it to her child. Indeed, when that
happens, it is a parent originally accessing the material, and the subsequent de-
livery to the child is no longer commercial and therefore COPA has absolutely no
applicability.
108. Child Online Protection Act, Pub. L. 105-277, Div. C, Title XIV § 1402(1), 112
Stat. 2681-736 (1998).
109. Id. § 1402(2) (emphasis added).
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lated nothing-in either the language of the statute or the findings-
that narrows the protected class from "any" minor.
However, a narrowing of the class to be protected from harmful
commercial material is precisely what occurred in the Supreme Court
majority opinion. The Court over-emphasized the first finding, and
concluded that "COPA presumes that parents lack the ability,110 not
the will,"'1 to monitor what their children see."112 While it is argua-
ble that the Court's suggested alternative, filtering software, is not as
effective even in instances when parents do "lack the ability [but] not
the will,"113 the Court was wrong in using such an ambiguous con-
struction of those to be protected-COPA was certainly meant to also
protect children whose parents have the ability but lack the will. For
instance, a parent could lack the will because the parent has not given
any thought to the topic-the parent is indifferent.1'4 In this case,
under the Court's opinion, the child of such a parent was not thought
by Congress to be protected. However, given Congress's stated intent,
this conclusion seems contrary to COPA's objective. Further, under
the Court's analysis, Congress did not intend COPA to protect those
children whose parents lack both the ability and the will. Again, this
seems contrary to COPA's drafted applicability.
Effectively, the Court presumed COPA was an act established only
to aid parents as a tool to safeguard what their children see (leaving it
to parents to safeguard their children), not an act to protect children
directly. In other words, the Supreme Court's decision stands for the
notion that only those children with parents who otherwise would ac-
tively take part in what their children see, because they have both the
ability and the will (thereby installing filtering software) were to be
protected by COPA.
But Congress did not draft COPA to apply to only those minors
whose parents' control is frustrated, and there is no reason for the
110. The Court never defines "ability," but presumably the Court means a parent with
ability is a parent with sufficient knowledge, money, and presence.
111. The Court never defines "will," but presumably the Court means a parent with
will is a parent who wants to actively participate in the rearing of her child.
112. Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656, 670 (2004).
113. It seems that what the Court really means when suggesting the use of filtering
software is that only those children of parents with both the ability and the will
(those who can and want to install filtering software) are protected.
114. I do not mean parents who want their children to see the sex speech. If a parent
actively decides her child can view something, that parent, under COPA, would
be allowed to do so. See supra note 107. COPA does not completely circumvent
parental responsibility over what the parent deems appropriate; the government
is not raising the child. Rather, COPA ensures that a parent has at least had the
opportunity to screen certain material that according to the parent's discretion is
not appropriate for her particular child. In other words, COPA forces active par-
ticipation of the parent, with (in cases where the parent will not participate) a
default rule of not allowing the child to view the sex speech.
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Court to have interpreted the congressional intent as such. The aim of
COPA should not be limited by (i) a parent's apathy toward sexually
explicit material on the Internet, or (ii) a parent's inability to buy or
install the software. COPA has a much broader governmental inter-
est in mind. While it indeed does help some parents safeguard their
children, COPA was sanctioned in part to help in the protection of a
minor's well-being by shielding such a minor from harmful material.
The plain meaning of the words in COPA, specifically the word any,
should be given effect. As such, COPA should have been interpreted
to apply to every minor and the Supreme Court, in interpreting COPA
otherwise, narrowed the class intended to be protected by COPA.
B. Do We Pass Now?
1. More Effective?
The analysis now, in light of a correct "broadened" compelling in-
terest, turns to the effectiveness of filtering software. The Court made
much of the fact that a special congressional commission found that
filters have an effectiveness rating of 7.4, versus the verification
screens COPA employs, which have an effectiveness rating of 5.9.115
One of the reasons for this is that an estimated forty percent of all
explicit material comes from sites operated outside the country1
6-
material against which COPA would not protect. Also, COPA does not
apply to non-commercial sites or other electronic forms, such as e-
mail.1 17 Finally, COPA would not prevent minors who have their own
credit or debit card from being able to circumvent the adult verifica-
tion screens. 118 For these reasons, when viewed in light of a compel-
ling interest that assumes the use of such filtering software, it is
possible to find that filtering software is likely to be more effective. 11 9
115. Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 668.
116. Id. at 667. Justice Breyer, in his dissent, notes that while it is true forty percent
of sexually explicit material comes from overseas, a sixty percent reduction of
such material available to children is not a difference that we can label as "insig-
nificant." Id. at 687 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 668 (majority opinion). Indeed, the fact that the CDA did not apply to only
commercial website operators was a main factor in the Supreme Court's finding it
unconstitutional. Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 865 (1997).
118. Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 667. Justice Breyer, in his dissent, notes that while COPA
is not perfect, "the presence of filtering software is not an alternative legislative
approach to the problem of protecting children from exposure to commercial por-
nography. Rather, it is part of the status quo, i.e., the backdrop against which
Congress enacted the present statute." Id. at 684 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added).
119. Justice Breyer, in his dissent, offers answers to these concerns. See supra notes
116, 118. However, the intent of this section is not to suggest that filters are less
effective when actual use of a filter is compared to COPA; rather, the intent is to
demonstrate that the absence of filters is a concern, especially if the protection of
every minor is the governmental interest.
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However, to "[iimpose selective restrictions on speech at the receiving
end, not universal restrictions at the source" 120 is clearly less effective
when the compelling interest is to protect every minor, and not just
those minors whose parents have installed filtering software.121
A parent's ability to monitor with filtering software only exists at
one receiving end, namely that family's household computer. A child
can therefore circumvent filtering software by simply going to a differ-
ent computer, for example to the computer of a friend who has less
precautionary parents. Filtering software only restricts one machine,
but does not restrict a minor. A restriction at the source, however,
restricts all minors, and makes it impossible for a minor to circumvent
a machine with filtering software.122
Filters are not mandatory, and they will filter nothing if they are
never installed. The Court touches the argument that "filtering
software is not an available alternative because Congress may not re-
quire it to be used."1 23 The Court, however, quickly dismissed this
notion, stating the "argument carries little weight, because Congress
undoubtedly may act to encourage the use of filters."124 Reaching
every parent to encourage them to buy, install, and learn how to use
filtering software, and to have them actually do so, is a daunting task,
even for the United States Congress.
Assuming, however, that every parent can be encouraged by Con-
gress, a parent might not have the means to purchase or the knowl-
edge to use the software. COPA's restriction at the source allows even
the children of these parents to be protected, where filtering software
unmistakably does not. Filtering software will not protect children
whose parents cannot, either from a lack of money' 25 or a lack of
knowledge, install filtering software, and is therefore less effective
than COPA.
120. Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 657.
121. Further, it is important to note COPA provides that "any other reasonable mea-
sures that are feasible under available technology" can be employed to ascertain
the age of the user. 47 U.S.C. § 231(d)(1)(A) (2000), validity called into doubt by
Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656 (2004). COPA changes with
technology as less restrictive means become available.
122. See also Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 685 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("[F]iltering software
depends upon parents willing to decide where their children will surf the Web
and able to enforce that decision. As to millions of American families, that is not
a reasonable possibility. More than 28 million school age children have both par-
ents or their sole parent in the work force [and] at least 5 million children are left
alone at home without supervision each week.").
123. Id. at 669 (majority opinion).
124. Id.
125. Justice Breyer saw the monetary cost as a serious inadequacy of filtering
software, commenting that "[niot every family has the $40 or so necessary to
install it." Id. at 685 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Moreover, congressional encouragement realistically will not lead
all parents to install filtering software, especially those parents who
are indifferent to the matter. Therefore, in the absence of filtering
software, some children will be left exposed to explicit material on the
Internet. However, under COPA, when the interest advanced by the
Act is the protection of every child and not just those whose parents
actively participate, a parent's indifference would not hamper the ob-
jective of protecting minors from the harms of pornography. Filtering
software will not protect children whose parents will not install filter-
ing software, and is therefore less effective than COPA.
Further, Congressional encouragement might not reach every par-
ent. Without such encouragement, parents might not take steps to
monitor their child. These parents might not even be aware that any
problem exists. Again, the absence of filtering software prevents the
compelling interest advanced by COPA from being realized.
In arguing that Congress could encourage the use of filtering
software, the Court relied heavily on United States v. Playboy En-
tertainment Group,126 saying that case was "the closest precedent on
the general point ... ."127 That case involved a statute provision that
was a response to "signal bleed[ing]," times when the technology used
to scramble adult cable programming fails for a brief period and al-
lows for audio or visual elements of the program to be viewed.128 The
provision required certain named cable operators to either scramble
the programs in full (facing large penalties if there were any signal
bleed) or only air such erotic programs between 10:00 p.m. and 6:00
a.m. 129 The Court considered an alternative to the provision-con-
gressional encouragement of a full-block request, which, when re-
quested by the cable subscriber, would completely block the
programming with no problems of signal bleeding. The Court con-
cluded that such an alternative was as effective and less restrictive,
stating that "a court should not presume parents, given full informa-
tion, will fail to act."130
However, while the Court in Playboy recognized that the material
did have First Amendment protection, it is important to note that the
Court started its analysis by saying "[when) the material comes un-
wanted into homes where children might see or hear it against paren-
tal wishes or consent, there are legitimate reasons for regulating
it."131 Further, the Court stated that broadcast media, like cable tele-
vision (and arguably the Internet), "presents unique problems . . .
126. 529 U.S. 803 (2000).
127. Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 670.
128. Playboy, 529 U.S. at 806.
129. Id. at 808.
130. Id. at 824.
131. Id. at 811.
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which may justify restrictions that would be unacceptable in other
contexts" 13 2 and that "[n]o one suggests the Government must be in-
different to unwanted, indecent speech that comes into the home with-
out parental consent." 133 The Court ultimately struck down the ban
in Playboy because the government was unable to disprove that "its
interest is not sufficiently compelling to justify this widespread re-
striction on speech."'34
Because of what the Court said, it becomes important to point out
some major distinctions between the signal bleed provision in Playboy
and COPA. Presumably, if there is a sufficiently compelling interest,
then there is a justification for the restriction of speech, even in con-
texts when it might not otherwise be appropriate.13 5 The Court in
Playboy saw as the central weakness the government's inability to
present "hard evidence of how serious the problem of signal bleed is
... [and] no proof as to how likely any child is to view a discernible
explicit image .. ."136 Conversely, the availability of sexually explicit
material on the Internet is not contested, as "[a] child, with minimal
knowledge of a computer, the ability to operate a browser, and the
skill to type a few simple words may be able to access sexual images
and content over the World Wide Web."137 Second, the regulation in
Playboy applied specifically to named providers.138 Consequently, a
provider named by the Playboy Act would be restrained, while any
other provider who made available exactly the same material but was
not specifically named would not be restricted. COPA, on the other
hand, applies universally to all commercial Internet content provid-
ers. No provider is specifically singled out; instead, all providers are
treated equally. Finally, the less restrictive means necessitated no
money from parents, and required no specialized technological knowl-
edge. Rather, the parent, once informed of the availability of the full-
block option, merely had to make a phone call to make the request.
Filtering software is different. It requires an outlay of about forty dol-
lars.13 9 It requires specialized knowledge for operation. (Indeed, in
an era where children are technologically leaps and bounds ahead of
their parents, it might be the child teaching the parent how to use the
filtering software!) While a phone call is fairly comfortable, the cost
and knowledge required to use the technology might frustrate a par-
ent's desire to actually use the technology. It then becomes, not a pa-
132. Id. at 813.
133. Id. at 814.
134. Id. at 825 (emphasis added).
135. See supra text accompanying notes 132-33.
136. Playboy, 529 U.S. at 819 (emphasis added).
137. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473, 476 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
138. Playboy, 529 U.S. at 813.
139. Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656, 685 (2004) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
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rental failure to act, but a parental inability to act, something which
the Court did not seem to take into account.
2. Less Restrictive?
While not flowing directly from a broadened compelling interest, it
is nevertheless worthwhile to briefly address the arguments the Su-
preme Court used to contend that filtering software is less restrictive
than COPA.140 First, the Court concluded that filtering software was
less restrictive because it imposed limited restrictions at the user end,
not a blanket restriction at the source. However, as Justice Breyer
points out in the dissent, filtering is imperfect, "allowing some porno-
graphic material to pass through without hindrance"141 and blocking
other sexually related but non-pornographic material. This is because
filtering software only searches for key phrases to block certain mate-
rial, so it does not discriminate between materials that might contain
educational, scientific, or social value. "[Tihe software alone cannot
distinguish between the most obscene pictorial image and the Venus
de Milo."142 Age-verification screens, on the other hand, target a spe-
cific type of speech that has been defined as harmful to minors, a defi-
nition that takes into account educational, scientific, or social value.
It is much more accurate, regulates only that material Congress
wants to regulate, does not restrict that which Congress does not wish
to restrict, and, consequently is an arguably less restrictive alterna-
tive to filtering software.
Second, the Court raised privacy concerns, stating that while non-
use of filters is anonymous, use of age-verification screens would re-
quire a person to identify himself. However, Congress took this
concern into account when COPA was drafted and imparted certain
privacy safeguards into COPA. The identity of the user is protected by
section (d)(1) of COPA, which provides that any person collecting in-
formation required by COPA "shall not disclose any information...
without the prior written consent"14 3 of the user concerned. Further,
sensitive information such as a credit card number is protected by sec-
tion (d)(2), which provides that any person collecting the information
required by COPA "shall take such actions as are necessary to prevent
unauthorized access to such information."144
140. See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
141. Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 685 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
142. Id.
143. 47 U.S.C. § 231(d)(1)(A) (2000), validity called into doubt by Ashcroft v. Am. Civil
Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656 (2004).
144. Id. § 231(d)(1)(B); see also Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 683 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(speaking about possible fear of embarrassment, Justice Breyer stated that "this
Court has held that in the context of congressional efforts to protect children,
restrictions of this kind do not automatically violate the Constitution").
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Finally, the Court expressed concern that COPA utilizes criminal
penalties for violation of its provisions. However, it is important to
note that most states already have statutes that provide for criminal
punishments for selling sexually explicit material to minors. In Colo-
rado, for example, distribution of pornographic material to a minor is
a class 2 misdemeanor.14 5 In Arizona, violation of a similar statute is
a class 4 felony. 146 But the criminal punishment is not dealt in own-
ing, buying, selling, or viewing non-obscene, sexually explicit mate-
rial. Such a category of speech is not in any way condemned as
criminal. To violate the statutes, one must allow a minor to come into
possession of that material.147
It is not the speech that is condemned as criminal, but the dissemi-
nation of that speech to a distinct, specific, and well-defined audience.
Moreover, almost every state has already condemned such distribu-
tion as criminal,148 most using similar definitions to identify the ob-
jectionable material which, deliberately, is the same definition
employed by COPA.149 COPA does not make something new unlawful.
If done only on a state level, the commercial distribution of material
that is harmful to minors is illegal. The argument that "above all,
promoting the use of filters does not condemn as criminal any category
of speech"150 seems to fall apart.
C. A "Compelling" Compelling Interest?
The validity of the compelling governmental interest did not re-
ceive much attention from any of the courts. The district court briefly
stated "[i]t is clear that Congress has a compelling interest in the pro-
tection of minors, including shielding them from materials that are
not obscene by adult standards."151 The Third Circuit agreed, merely
saying "there is a compelling interest in protecting the physical and
145. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-7-501 (2005).
146. ARIz. REV. STAT. § 13-3506 (2005).
147. See id. § 13-3506; COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-7-502; see also Reno v. Am. Civil Liber-
ties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 890 (describing the age-verification requirement as sim-
ilar to "a bouncer [who] checks a person's driver's license before admitting him to
a nightclub").
148. See, e.g., supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text.
149. 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(2). Note that many of these definitions stem from the current
obscenity analysis, given in Miller:
[Whether] the average person, applying contemporary community stan-
dards would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the pruri-
ent interest; whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently
offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state
law; and whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, ar-
tistic, political, or scientific value.
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
150. Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 658, 667 (2004).
151. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473, 495 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
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psychological well-being of minors."152 The Supreme Court, although
never declaring explicitly what it saw the compelling interest to be,
did conduct a less restrictive analysis, presumably with preventing
children from viewing material that is harmful to them as a bona fide
compelling interest.
While both the district and appellate courts only acknowledged the
existence of the first prong, and the Supreme Court majority did not
even clearly state anything concerning this prong, the first prong is an
important part of the analysis.1 53 To be sure, given the nature of the
legislation-a content-based restriction on constitutionally protected
speech-a court should presume that the "governmental regulation of
the content of speech is more likely to interfere with the free exchange
of ideas than to encourage it."154 That is why the first step of the
strict scrutiny analysis exists; there must be a compelling state inter-
est before any content-based restriction can be found constitutionally
valid.
Assuming the Supreme Court believes there is a compelling gov-
ernmental interest, and that interest is safeguarding minors from the
harms of pornography, it does not require the legislature to provide
any sort of empirical evidence of that harm. Rather, with Ginsberg,
the Court can allow the legislature to rely on its own rational intui-
tion. In other words, there is no need for a legislature to present any
empirical or scientific facts to support its proposed legislation.15 5
Using a rational relation test to validate the existence of the first
prong of a strict scrutiny analysis is troublesome for at least two rea-
sons. First, use of the rational relation test is troublesome because it
does not force Congress to clearly define what it sees as a problem
(compelling interest), leaving both Congress, as well as the courts,
with a certain degree of uncertainty with which to deal. This uncer-
tainty could lead a legislature to not fully understand the problem it is
trying to solve, thereby creating a remedy that does not fully or effec-
tively address the perceived reason for the remedy. Further, this un-
certainty could lead a court to draw incorrect inferences about the
legislation, similar to the one I have suggested the Court drew about
COPA.
However, providing empirical evidence would help Congress clarify
its own findings. "A requirement that legislators provide empirical
152. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 240, 251 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639-40 (1968)). The court went on to say
"The parties agree that the Government's stated interest in protecting minors
from harmful material online is compelling. This being so, we proceed to the next
question of whether COPA is narrowly tailored to meet that interest." Id.
153. It is the first step of the strict scrutiny analysis! See supra notes 64-65 and ac-
companying text.
154. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 493.
155. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 641.
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support for their legislation can ... help legislators focus on whether
there truly is a nexus between the end pursued and the means em-
ployed."156 Further, empirical evidence would guide the courts, help-
ing "judges [to] decide which arguments in the child-protection
censorship debate are more compelling."157 Empirical evidence would
not only help both Congress and the courts understand their own
analyses, but would also help them better understand each other.
Clarifying and supporting the legislation would, in other words, help
facilitate the discussion about the legislation.158
Second, use of a rational relation test to support a strict scrutiny
analysis causes some constitutionality concerns. As one commentator
has noted, there "are many areas of constitutional jurisprudence in
which the Court forgoes its power to review laws and instead defers to
the political branches ... [applying] a 'rational relationship' test that
is really no test at all but rather a statement of judicial restraint."159
While this outlook alone is somewhat troubling (especially in the con-
text of speech restrictions, where unpopular speech can be subject to
government censorship), it is exacerbated by a possible lack of con-
gressional self-restraint. Take, for example, the sentiment of United
States Representative Jerrold Nadler, senior member of the House Ju-
diciary Committee, 160 speaking to the suggestion that Congress re-
frain from attempting to extend its Commerce Clause powers:
But, [ I as I understand the argument, the argument is we shouldn't pass this
because it is extending the Commerce Clause into local affairs, extending con-
gressional powers into local affairs..., but the fact is we are not extending
anything. The courts will tell us exactly what our authority is and whatever it
is, it is, and that is how far it will go. 161
While Representative Nadler was speaking about the Commerce
Clause, and not about First Amendment issues, the attitude is clear-
members of Congress do not always submit their proposed legislation
156. Alan E. Garfield, Protecting Children From Speech, 57 FLA. L. REV. 565, 592-93
(2005).
157. Id. at 592.
158. For more on a possible dialogue between the Court and Congress, see Stephen L.
Carter, The Morgan "Power" and the Forced Reconsideration of Constitutional De-
cisions, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 819, 851-62 (1986).
159. Garfield, supra note 156, at 577-78 (citing JOHN MONAHAN & LAURA WALKER,
SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAw 10 (5th ed. 2002) ("[The] rational relationship test... still
limits all legislation, but since 1937 its application has been tantamount to find-
ing legislation constitutional; the court has found virtually any proposed reason
sufficient to sustain a statute."); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 8.2.3, at 604 (2d ed. 2002)).
160. Biography of Representative Jarrold Naddler, http://www.house.gov/nadler/biog-
raphy.shtml (last visited May 15, 2006).
161. Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1999: Hearing on H.R. 1691 Before the Sub-
comm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 323
(1999) (statement of Rep. Jerrold Nadler, Member, House Comm. on the
Judiciary).
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to the exacting constitutional scrutiny that perhaps they should, and
rather rely on the courts to limit their legislation.162 If Congress is
not analyzing the legislation for constitutional violations, and the
Court in turn is deferring to Congress, who is protecting free speech
interests?
However, if the Court were to require Congress to provide empiri-
cal evidence to validate its own legislation, perhaps Congress would
take a more comprehensive look at the problems it is seeking to rec-
tify, especially any constitutional ramifications.163 Further, the Court
could review the empirical evidence, providing "an effective means of
weeding out some of the more egregious forms of censorship."16 4
"[Liegislators might think twice before enacting child-protection cen-
sorship laws when there is no empirical evidence to support their
actions."165
It is important to remember that the speech in question is not ob-
scenity, which "is not protected expression and may be suppressed
without a showing of the circumstances which lie behind the phrase
clear and present danger in its application to protected speech."16 6
Rather, the speech in question has already been determined to fall
within the First Amendment circle-it is protected speech-at least as
far as adults are concerned. As such, it does not make any sense to
say, on one hand, that "we require the strictest scrutiny" when talking
about a content-based regulation on First Amendment protected
speech, and then on the other to use Ginsberg and say that "we do not
require empirical evidence from our legislatures-we will uphold the
compelling interest if the legislature can rationally conclude harm
stems from the speech." 16 7 "Rationally" and "strictest" are not synon-
ymous, and should not be treated as such.
162. See Bradley P. Jacob, Free Exercise in the "Lobbying Nineties," 84 NEB. L. REV.
795, 826 n.131 (2006) ("Not only among political scientists, law professors, and
advocates, but also within Congress itself, it is very hard to get past the idea that
Congress should just take action on any issue that interests it and wait for the
Supreme Court to tell it that it has stepped over its boundaries.").
163. See Garfield, supra note 156, at 592-93 ("A requirement that legislators provide
empirical support for their legislation can slow down the legislative process and
help legislators focus on whether there truly is a nexus between the end pursued
and the means employed.").
164. Id. (noting that it would be difficult "to find empirical support for the proposition
that Harry Potter books are harmful to children," thereby allowing a court to eas-
ily "dismiss a law banning" those books).
165. Id.
166. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 641 (1968).
167. The Ginsberg Court admitted that "the reading of pornography [was] unlikely to
be per se harmful." Id. at 642 n.10. Further, the Ginsberg Court acknowledged
that the "studies all agree that a causal link [between the viewing of pornography
and harm] has not been demonstrated." Id. at 642. If this type of speech is not
per se harmful, and there is not even a causal link between viewing pornography
and harm required, how can the pledge of the "strictest scrutiny" be upheld? It is
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Due to the infancy of the sex speech jurisprudence, the Ginsberg
standard may have been sensible at the time Ginsberg was decided.
The Roth decision was only a decade old, and Miller had not even hit
the Supreme Court. The sex speech jurisprudence was not very well
developed, and (some might argue), it was prudent to rule on the side
of caution. The Ginsberg decision allowed state regulation of sex
speech to pass constitutional muster without forcing the state to
spend a lot of time proving the harm.168 However, much has hap-
pened since the 1960s, including the development of technology that
allows for dissemination of speech in a manner that was previously
unavailable and unimaginable. Therefore, it is becoming increasingly
more important (but with greater occasion) to specifically define the
"harm" caused if we are to debate the existence of a problem and the
effectiveness of a remedy.169
no answer that "a causal link has not been disproved." Id. The fact that certain
speech is controversial (or against societal norms) does not give a legislature an
automatic right to regulate it. This is the basic guarantee of the First Amend-
ment-that unpopular speech will not be allowed to be suppressed by the major-
ity and that a free discourse of ideas will be allowed.
168. I do not believe that making the first prong of the strict scrutiny test harder (by
requiring empirical evidence) will ultimately make passage of this type of legisla-
tion more difficult. In fact, I believe that quite the opposite will be true, and that
the requirement of empirical evidence will only increase the time it takes to draft
the legislation. But by setting a higher bar for the first prong, the courts will be
somewhat pigeonholed into how to frame the issues for the other two prongs. In
other words, clarifying and supporting the legislation will only help the eventual
passage of the legislation.
169. This assertion is not completely without support. There have been several in-
stances when the Court has used or required empirical evidence. See Garfield,
supra note 156, at 589-90 (citing several cases where the Court has used or re-
quired empirical evidence, including 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517
U.S. 484 (1996), Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001), Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45 (1905), and Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)); see
also Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622 (1997). At issue in Turner
was the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, in
which Congress passed a "must carry" provision that required "cable operators to
carry the signals of a specified number of local broadcast television stations." Id.
at 630. That act was designed with "the intention of preserving free broadcast
television, [ I promoting widespread dissemination of information, and [ I promot-
ing fair competition." Id. at 624. After the Court determined that the provision
would be subject to intermediate scrutiny, it made the following comment about
the lack of empirical evidence:
But even if one accepts [the given statistical evidence] as evidence that a
large number of broadcast stations would be dropped or repositioned in
the absence of must-carry, the Government must further demonstrate
that broadcasters so affected would suffer financial difficulties as a re-
sult. Without a more substantial elaboration in the District Court of the
predictive or historical evidence upon which Congress relied, or the in-
troduction of some additional evidence to establish that the dropped or
repositioned broadcasters would be at serious risk of financial difficulty,
we cannot determine whether the threat to broadcast television is real
enough to overcome the challenge to the provisions made by these appel-
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I do not mean to suggest that providing empirical evidence will be
easy. As one commentator has noted, "U]udges are not trained as so-
cial scientists and therefore venture beyond their expertise when they
evaluate empirical data .... It is also true that the legislative process
is not ideally suited for developing a coherent evidentiary record in
support of legislation."170 These are both valid concerns, and any
judge examining empirical evidence should do so knowing the limita-
tions and drawbacks of empirical evidence. What I am suggesting,
however, is that requiring a legislature to provide empirical evidence
is a big step in the right direction. Unless the legislature is required
to provide empirical evidence, a real discourse about the propriety of
the legislation will likely not occur.
IV. CONCLUSION
What this case represents is the all too familiar First Amendment
argument between the lesser of two evils-privacy, coupled with free
speech of unpopular ideas, versus societal expectations. But the Su-
preme Court is not in a position to legislate this type of thing, nor are
they willing to put themselves into the debate. Rather, they continue
to ignore the important issues which require serious analysis. In the
past, "community standards" have been a saving grace-the idea that
there are so many differing opinions about pornography, depending on
where those who are forming that opinion exist, that the Supreme
Court cannot come down and make a blanket rule that applies to eve-
ryone. But in the past decade, technological advances have opened a
Pandora's Box of issues that need to be addressed.
Ultimately, the underlying issue of whether such legislation is
warranted can only be resolved with empirical studies determining
the actual necessity of such legislation. The Supreme Court must
abandon the sentiment expressed in Ginsberg that (when ruling about
speech that falls within the First Amendment circle), empirical evi-
dence is not necessary and a compelling interest can be upheld with a
mere rational relation to the facts. Unfortunately, at present the Su-
preme Court will not require such evidence, nor are they willing to
lants. We think it significant, for instance, that the parties have not
presented any evidence that local broadcast stations have fallen into
bankruptcy, turned in their broadcast licenses, curtailed their broadcast
operations, or suffered a serious reduction in operating revenues as a
result of their being dropped from, or otherwise disadvantaged by, cable
systems.
Id. at 667. Applying this sentiment to the strict scrutiny analysis in the Ashcroft
case, one could ask why the Court did not think it significant that the parties
have not presented any evidence that minors viewing pornography has caused
deep psychological and physical harm, caused antisocial behavior, or turned
those minors into serial rapists.
170. Garfield, supra note 156, at 592.
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engage in any debate on the topic, leaving the rest of us with a discus-
sion that cannot be argued. In my opinion, the Court needs to take the
opportunity that the COPA legislation is providing to seriously ana-
lyze, and retool if necessary, current First Amendment issues as they
relate to sex speech, minors, and obscenity.
Michael J. Kuhn
